September 1991 COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CHALLENGES IN A CHANGING WORLD By William S. Sessions Director Federal Bureau of Investigation In recent years, the world witnessed some truly amazing events--the fall of the Berlin Wall and the reunification of East and West Germany, the beginnings of democratic governments across Eastern Europe, and the easing of political tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. As a result, the current perception of most Americans is that foreign intelligence activity directed against the United States and the West is decreasing, and therefore, the need for an active, aggressive counterintelligence response has abated. Unfortunately, this is far from true. There can be no doubt that important changes are taking place in the world today. However, improved diplomatic relations do not necessarily decrease the foreign intelligence threat to U.S. national security. The truth remains: That threat still exists, as it did in the past and as it will in the future. DECADE OF THE 1980S The last decade of the cold war, the 1980s, was designated by the media as "The Decade of the Spy." It was a time when Americans knew who their enemies were--a time when President Ronald Reagan referred to the Soviet Union as "The Evil Empire." The American public showed strong support of counterintelligence efforts and participated in the process by reporting suspicious events. During the 1980s, more than 45 people were arrested for espionage. Increased human and technical resources, enhanced analytical and training programs, and improved coordination within the U.S. intelligence community and with friendly foreign intelligence services contributed significantly to these arrests. However, much of the success in counterintelligence efforts came as a result of a heightened public awareness of the full damage caused by espionage, as well as the public's support of the measures designed to protect Americas vital information. In addition to the importance of public awareness, the 1980s taught us several other important lessons. First, the American public received a rude awakening regarding the vulnerability of the U.S. national security community from spies within its own ranks. For example, both John Walker and Jerry Whitworth served in the U.S. Navy; Karel Koecher, Larry Chin, and Edward Howard all worked for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); Ronald Pelton was a National Security Agency employee; Richard Miller was an FBI Special Agent. Second, many of the dangers were posed by volunteers. That is, many of those arrested during the 1980s, including Walker, simply offered to spy on their country. And they offered to spy not because they had ideological differences with the U.S. Government or ideological sympathy with a foreign government, as was the case during World War II and the first decade of the Cold War. They spied for the basest of reasons--money. Third, prosecuting spies was found to be an effective tool to determine the extent of the damage caused to national security. Unfortunately, some of the espionage cases of the 1980s resulted in grave damage to U.S. national security interests. But, without the prosecutions that followed, an accurate accounting of what was lost would not have been possible, and appropriate steps to minimize the damage would not have been taken. Fortunately, in 45 percent of the espionage cases during the 1980s, the work the U.S. counterintelligence community uncovered either prevented the espionage activity or significantly limited the damages. THE CHANGING WORLD In the 1990s, with the easing of tensions between superpowers and military blocs, it is no longer possible to identify the U.S. counterintelligence mission in terms of these relationships alone--the world has become much too complex for that. America has negotiated historic arms reduction treaties with the Soviets. The Soviets have introduced their programs of Glasnost, openness to the West, and Perestroika, internal economic and political restructuring. And, the world has witnessed the nations of Eastern Europe revolt against their former Communist leaders in favor of new freedom and economic diversity, and in some cases, more democratic forms of government. While all Americans can agree that the world has changed, and most see that change as positive in terms of an enhanced prospect for world peace, the public tends to view this new world order to be devoid of danger. So, the logic goes, that if there is no longer a threat to U.S. national security, then counterintelligence measures are not needed. But, the reality is that arms reduction treaties between the United States and the Soviet Union give Soviet "inspectors" potential access to some of this country's most sensitive projects. Glasnost has dramatically expanded the number of exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union in such areas as business, science, and education. In fact, since Glasnost, the number of Soviets traveling to the United States increased almost 400 percent; in 1990 alone, more than 100,000 Soviets visited the United States. Past experience shows that these exchange groups often contain intelligence officers. Furthermore, the countries of Eastern Europe, while attempting to move away from the Soviet sphere of influence, are now fighting for their own economic survival--and they, too, have a need for Western technology. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE THREATS Arms control treaties between the Soviet Union and the United States will hopefully lead to a diminished threat level between the nations. However, from a counterintelligence perspective, these treaties will give the Soviet intelligence services routine access to sensitive areas and to knowledgeable Americans who are linked to classified information which, until now, was attainable only on a very limited basis. Other treaties presently being negotiated, concerning strategic arms reduction and chemical weapons, would require numerous verification sites, again expanding Soviet access. But, the Soviets are interested in more than American military secrets. The Soviet economy is in desperate shape and can be revitalized with Western technology, capital, and expertise. In order to strengthen that economy, the chairman of the KGB has publicly stated that it plans to assist Soviet businesses because, as he says, "They are not good businessmen." The Soviets have systematically expanded their intelligence collection beyond military intelligence targets and now routinely include Western economic information and technologies. Since the Soviets can no longer rely on their former surrogate intelligence services in the Eastern Bloc to collect intelligence for them, they must find other sources of intelligence and develop new surrogate services. The Soviets have started using the intelligence services of other countries to obtain Stealth technology and acquire restricted computer technologies for themselves. Recent repression by the Soviet government of dissent in the Baltic Republics may very well signal a new shift in Soviet internal policy away from the liberalization of Glasnost. This, in turn, may have far-reaching implications involving the Soviet military and its intelligence services, U.S. national security, and the emerging "new world order." All in all, while the nature of the Soviet intelligence threat may be changing, its objectives and actions are not. The Soviet intelligence services are more active now than they have been at any time in the past 10 years, and there is every reason to believe that they will continue their pursuit of Western intelligence during the 1990s. The threat of Eastern European countries to the United States cannot be fully assessed because they themselves have not yet fully defined the nature and scope of their intelligence services. Some of these countries are no longer collecting intelligence on behalf of the Soviet Union; however, they will, in all likelihood, refocus their collection activities in the United States to fulfill their own requirements. Since, as with the Soviets, the current major focus of these nations is economic reorganization and growth, they also have a real need for Western technology. What about the People's Republic of China (PRC)? The PRC has the largest foreign official presence in the United States--2,700 diplomats and commercial officials, 43,000 scholars, 25,000 commercial delegates visiting the United States annually, and 20,000 emigres coming to America each year. The PRC remains a major counterintelligence threat to the United States. Their intelligence services target well-educated Chinese-American scientists and other professionals who have access to useful information and technology using the approach: "Please help China modernize." While the Soviet Union, the former Eastern Bloc countries, and the People's Republic of China are all traditional intelligence threats, U.S. counterintelligence efforts can no longer focus exclusively on these countries. In this information age, any number of countries can attempt to establish the infrastructure required to carry out intelligence collection activities in the United States, both overtly and clandestinely. Essentially, Americans need to be concerned about nontraditional intelligence threats to this country as well. With this point in mind, the intelligence activities of countries in the Middle East and Central Asia are becoming more significant. For example, the Iraqi intelligence service was very active in the United States during the 1980s, and in light of the recent war in the Persian Gulf, its activities are likely to continue. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE RESPONSIBILITIES The FBI is charged with countering the hostile activities of foreign intelligence services in the United States by identifying and neutralizing these activities. It does this by penetrating these services, disrupting or publicizing their illegal activities, and expelling, arresting, or prosecuting those responsible. However, the FBI cannot meet its counterintelligence mission alone. Coordination of counterintelligence operations with other members of the intelligence community, and frequently joint operations, is critical to the Bureau's success, along with the support of the Executive and Legislative Branches of the Federal Government, the law enforcement community, and the American public. While the FBI has the responsibility to make the public more aware of the hostile intelligence threat, it relies heavily on information from the public to fulfill its counterintelligence mission. Because many Americans no longer perceive the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries as a threat to U.S. security, the FBI must comprehensively expose the full scope of this threat to American institutions, facilities, and citizens. The purpose behind this is to protect national security, not to discourage improved relations and trade between the United States and the rest of the world. CONCLUSION The world is in a constant state of flux. What is true today may not be true tomorrow. For this reason, it is critical to identify the exact nature of any hostile intelligence threat to national security and to counter that threat. A heightened awareness by all Americans is the most effective weapon available to accomplish this task. By working together, citizens and law enforcement agencies can successfully meet the counterintelligence challenges of today and those of the years to come.