CHAPTER II. HOW AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP MAY BE ACQUIRED A. IN THE NATION By Birth PURSUANT to the provisions of the XIV Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, the Federal statutes provide as follows: "All persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are declared to be citizens of the United States." (1) This language has been held to include a person born in the United States of parents of Chinese descent and subjects of the Emperor of China, they being at the time of his birth domiciled residents, engaged in business in the United States. It has also been held to embrace the half-breed children of a white father and an Indian mother living apart from her tribe, born within the United States, reared and educated as other children of citizens; (3) and even under the XIII Amendment colored persons were held to be citizens.(4) But an Indian born a member of one of the Indian tribes within the United States(5) does not, merely by reason of his birth in the United States and his separation from his tribe and residence among white citizens, become a citizen. A negro born in slavery and afterwards becoming a citizen of the Cherokee Nation has been held to be not an Indian.(6) By special enactment, all persons born in the country formerly known as the Territory of Oregon and subject to the jurisdiction of the United States on the 18th day of May, 1872, are declared citizens of the United States.(7) By Naturalization. We have already seen that the power to enact a uniform system of naturalization laws was among the first bestowed upon Congress by the Constitution. Naturalization is defined to be the act of adopting a foreigner and clothing him with the privileges of a native citizen.(8) The power of naturalization is vested exclusively in Congress by the Constitution, and cannot be exercised by the State.(9) Although the power to enact naturalization laws existed from the time the Constitution went into effect in 1789, the earliest Act of Congress on the subject of naturalization was passed April 14, 1802, thirteen years after the Constitution went into effect. Under the last named Act and sundry amendments, admission to citizenship of three principal classes of persons was provided for, to wit: First, aliens who had resided for a certain time within the limits and under the jurisdiction of the United States, to be naturalized individually by proceedings in a court of record.(10) Second, the children of persons so naturalized dwelling within the United States and being under the age of twenty-one at the time of such naturalization.(11) Third, foreign-born children of American citizens coming within the definitions prescribed by Congress.(12) Length of Residence Necessary. As early as 1813 Congress enacted that an alien, to be entitled to admission as a citizen, must have resided within the United States for a continuous term of five years.(13) This general provision is modified by several special enactments, as follows: An alien who has enlisted and has been honorably discharged from the regular volunteer forces of the Army of the United States is not required to prove more than one year's residence.(14) A seaman being a foreigner who declares his intention of becoming a citizen and then serves three years aboard a merchant vessel of the United States is entitled to be admitted.(15) An alien may be admitted to become a citizen of the United States in the following manner, and not otherwise:(16) First, a preliminary declaration of intention must be made. It must be made at least two years prior to his admission to citizenship. It must be made under oath before a circuit or district court of the United States or a district or supreme court of the Territories, or a court of record of any of the States having common-law jurisdiction,(17) and a seal and a clerk.(18) The declaration must state that it is the bona fide intention of the applicant to become a citizen of the United states, and to renounce forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty, particularly by name to the prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty of which the alien may be at the time a citizen or subject.(19) By an amendment enacted February 1, 1876,(20) the preliminary declaration of intention may be made before the clerk of any of the courts named above.(21) A preliminary declaration, however, is not required in the following cases: 1. The widow and children of an alien who has made his preliminary declaration and died before he was actually naturalized, are declared to be citizens upon taking the oaths prescribed by law.(22) 2. By an act passed May 26, 1824, (23) an alien being under twenty-one years of age who has resided in the United States three years next preceding his arrival at age, and who has continued to reside therein to the time he makes application to be admitted a citizen, may, after he attains the age of twenty-one and after he has resided five years within the United States, including the three years of his minority, be admitted without preliminary declaration.(24) 3. By an Act passed July 17, 1862,(25) an alien of the age of twenty-one years and upwards, who has enlisted or may enlist in the armies of the United States, (26)and has been honorably discharged, shall be admitted to become a citizen of the United states upon his petition, without any previous declaration of his intention. (27) 4. By an Act passed July 26, 1894,(28) aliens over twenty-one years of age, honorably discharged from the navy or marine corps after five consecutive years' service in the navy, or one enlistment in the marine corps, may be admitted without any previous declaration. Second, he shall, at the time of his application to be admitted, declare on oath before some one of the courts specified; a. That he will support the Constitution of the United States. b. That he renounces and abjures all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, etc. c. Particularly, by name, the prince or potentate of whom he was subject. d. The proceedings shall be recorded by the clerk. Third, it shall be made to appear to the court: a. That he has resided in the United States five years at least. b. Within State or Territory one year at least. c. That during that time he has behaved as a man of good character.(29) d. That he is attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the same.(30) e. But the oath of the applicant does not prove his residence.(31) Fourth, in case the alien applying to be admitted to citizenship has borne any hereditary title or been of any of the orders of nobility in the kingdom or state from which he came, he shall, in addition to the above requisites make an express renunciation of his title or order of nobility in the Court to which his application is made, and his renunciation shall be recorded in the court. The fifth and sixth clauses of the Naturalization Law may be omitted, as they simply declared certain persons residing in the United grates prior to the 29th of January, 1795, and between June 18, 1798, and June 18, 1812, to be citizens, and are no longer of any practical importance. The Naturalization Law further provides concerning children, as follows: 1. Children under age when their parents were duly naturalized under any law of the United States; or, 2. Children whose parents previous to the passing of the United States naturalization laws became citizens of any State; or, 3. Children born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, of persons who are or have been citizens of the United States - All the above are declared to be citizens of the United States. b. IN A STATE By Birth. Every State in the Union has enacted, either in its constitution or in its statutes, that all persons born in the State shall be deemed citizens of the State. The language is not identical, but it will be found substantially the same by reference to the constitutions and statutes of the several States. By State Enactments. All the States have, in one form or another, provided that all persons born in any other State of the Union who may be or become residents of the State enacting the law, and all aliens naturalized under the laws of the United States who may be or become residents of the State, shall be citizens of the State. A particular inspection of the laws of each State will be necessary to ascertain the precise language in which this general principle is declared, and the length of residence requisite in any particular state to require citizenship therein. By Federal Enactments The XIV Amendment to the Constitution of United States declares that all persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the State wherein they reside. The question what residence entitles a native or a naturalized citizen to all the privileges of citizenship in a particular State is generally determined by some State enactment prescribing the length of residence necessary to entitle a person to all the privileges of State citizenship. Until the enactment of the XIV Amendment, no attempt was ever made by the Federal government to define or limit the rights of citizenship in any State. c. OUTSIDE THE NATION OR STATES. We have already seen that under certain Federal statutes the widow and children of an alien who has made his preliminary declaration, and died without being actually naturalized, have certain inchoate rights of citizenship which they may make perfect upon taking the oaths prescribed by law, even though they have not been within the limits of the nation, or of the State. So, too, children born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, of persons who are citizens of the United States, are deemed citizens of the United States; and by the statutes of many of the States they are also deemed citizens of the State whereof their parents are citizens. For example, the author of this volume was born in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 1846, of parents who were citizens of the United States and of the state of Virginia. By the terms of the Federal statutes he is a citizen of the United States; and by the terms of the statutes of Virginia, all children, wherever born, whose fathers or if he be dead whose mother, was a citizen of Virginia at the time of the birth of such children, were to be deemed citizens of that State. A notable instance of such foreign birth is George B. McClellan, the present mayor of New York city, who was born in Dresden, Saxony. At the time of his birth his parents were citizens of New Jersey, his father, Capt. George B. McClellan, being in the service of the United States abroad. He is as much a citizen of the United States and of the State of New Jersey as if he had been born in Trenton, the capital of the State of New Jersey. But the citizenship of children whose fathers were citizens is qualified to this extent: the rights of citizenship of the parent do not descend to the children if the parents have never resided in the United States. Thus, if Mayor George B. McClellan had never resided in the United States, his son, George B. McClellan, third, would not inherit his father's right of citizenship in the United States. d. OF THE PERSONS WHO MAY BE CITIZENS. As a matter of course, Men may be citizens, and we will not discuss that further. Women may be citizens as well as men.(32) The statutes of the United States expressly provide that any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the United States, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen. The naturalization laws themselves provide (33) that the widow of an alien who has complied with the first condition of naturalization, and died without being actually naturalized, shall be considered a citizen. The political status of the wife follows that of the husband, with the modification that there must be withdrawal from her native country, or equivalent act expressive of her election to renounce her citizenship as a consequence of her marriage.(34) The citizenship acquired by the wife by marriage to a citizen of the United States is not a qualified or contingent one, but is as enduring and unqualified as if she had been naturalized upon her own formal application.(35) It may therefore happen that an alien may come to this country and become a citizen, whereby his wife, who might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen, although she did not come to the United States until after his death. His citizenship, in such case, confers citizenship upon her.(36) An alien woman whose husband became a naturalized citizen of the United States, thereby herself became a citizen, although she may have been living at a distance from her husband for years and may never have come into the United States until after his death.(37) And a woman married to a citizen of the United States is, by reason of her marriage, to be deemed a citizen, irrespective of the time or place of marriage, and although she may never have resided in the United States.(38) An alien widow of a naturalized citizen of the United States, although she never resided within the United States during the lifetime of her husband, is a citizen of the United States and is entitled to dower in his real estate.(39) A woman born in France, whose father was a citizen of the United States, and who married a French citizen and continued after the death of her husband to reside in France, is a citizen of France but not of the United States.(40) Children may be citizens. They are citizens by birth, and, as seen above, become citizens through the naturalization of their parents. By the express terms of the statute, however, the children born abroad of American citizens, whether the parents be citizens by birth or by naturalization, do not transmit their right of citizenship to their children unless they have themselves resided in the United States. e. NATIONAL AND STATE CITIZENSHIP NOT NECESSARILY COEXISTENT. A citizen of the United States does not thereby necessarily become a citizen of any particular State. This distinction is clearly pointed out in the Slaughter-house Cases cited above. The XIV Amendment declares that all persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside, but the amendment does not attempt to define what constitutes residence in the States. It might very well happen, for example, that a person had been naturalized in one State and lost his residence in that State by removing from it, without having acquired a residence in another State to which he had removed. The XIV Amendment cannot be so read as to make him a resident of any State except on the terms prescribed generally by the laws of that State for the acquisition of citizenship therein.(41) A curious anomaly resulting from the last-named condition in our complex system of national and State governments is found in the following state of facts; The Constitution of the United States provides (Art. I, Sec. 2) that the House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen every second year by the people of the several States, and electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislature. The naturalization laws give an alien no political rights as a citizen of the United States until he has been admitted to citizenship. In many of the States the qualifications for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislature are bestowed upon aliens who have made their preliminary declarations; consequently, it happens that in many instances the persons who vote for members of the Congress of the United States are not even citizens of the United States. Under this condition, it is conceivable that in the different States the votes of aliens to the United States might elect sufficient members of the House of Representatives of the United States to control action of the Congress of the United States. (1) Rev. Stat. U.S., Sec. 1992, 1 Fed. Stat. Annot. 785; The Slaughter-House Cases, (1872) 83 U.S. 36; In re Rodriguez, (1897) 81 Fed. Rep. 353. "While this amendment.... was intended primarily for the benefit of the negro race, It also confers the right of citizenship upon persons of all other races, white, yellow, or red, born or naturalized in the United States, and `subject to the jurisdiction thereof.' The language has been held to embrace even Chinese, to whom the laws of naturalization do not extend." In re Rodriguez (1897) 81 Fed. Rep. 353. (2) U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark. (1898) 169 U.S. 649; Citizenship etc., (1884) 21 Fed. Rep. 905; Lee Sing Far 9. U.S., (C.C.A. 1899) 94 Fed. Rep. 834; In re Yung Sing Hee, (1888) 36 Fed. Rep. 437; In re Giovanna, (1899) 93 Fed. Rep. 659; In re Wy Shing, (1898) 36 Fed. Rep. 553; Ex p. Chin King, (1888) 35 Fed. Rep. 354. (3) U.S. v. Hadley, (1900) 99 Fed. Rep. 437; U.S. v. Ward(1890) 42 Fed. Rep. 320; U.S. v. Higgins, (1901)110 Fed. Rep. 609, distinguishing U.S. v. Higgins, (1900) 103 Fed. Rep. 348. See also Farrell v. U.S., (C.C.A. 1901) 110 Fed. Rep. 942; Ex. p. Reynolds, (1879) 5 Dill. U.S. 394 (4) Hall v. De Cuir, (1877) 95 U.S. 509. See also U.S. v. Rhodes, (1866) 1 Ab. U.S. 28, 27 Fed. Cas. No. 16,151. (5) Elk v. Wilkins, (1884) 112 U.S. 94; U.S. v. Osborne, (1880)6 Sawy. U.S. 406; U.S. v. Boyd, (C.C.A. 1897) 82 Fed. Rep. 547. "Indians born within the territorial limits of the United States. members of, and owing immediate allegiance to, one of the Indian tribes (an alien, though dependent, power), although in a geographical sense born in the United States, are no more , born in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,, within the meaning of the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment, than the children of subjects of any foreign government born within the domain of that government, or the children born within the United States, of ambassadors or other public ministers of foreign nations.... Such Indians, then, not being citizens by birth, can only become citizens in the second way mentioned in the Fourteenth Amendment, by being `naturalized in the United States,' by or tinder home treaty or statute." Elk v. Wilkins, (1884) 112 U. S. 94. By Act of Congress, of Feb. 8, 1887. every Indian born within the territorial limits of the United States to whom allotments of land shall have been made under the provisions of the act, or under any law or treaty, and every indian born within the territorial limits of the United States who has voluntarily taken up, within said limits. his residence separate and apart from any tribe of Indians therein, and has adopted the habits of civilized life. is declared to be a citizen of the United States and entitled to all the rights, privileges, and immunities of such citizens. U. S. v. Kopp, (1901) 110 Fed. Rep. 160; In re Celestine, (1902) 114 Fed. Rep. 553; State v. Denoyer, (1897) 6 N. Dak. 586. See also U.S. v. Boyd, (C.C.A. 1897) 83 Fed. Rep. 547. (6) Alberly v. U. S., (1896) 162 U. S. 499. The term "Indian" is one descriptive of race, and therefore men of other races who are adopted into an Indian tribe do not thereby become Indians. They may by such adoption become entitled to certain privileges In the tribe, and make themselves amenable to its laws and usages. Yet they are not Indians. Responsibility to the laws of the United States cannot thus be thrown off and a right acquired to be treated by the government and its officers as if they were Indians born. U.S. v. Rogers, (1846) 4 How. U.S. 567. See also Westmoreland v. U.S., (1895) 155 U.S. 545; Roff v. Burney, (1897) 168 U. S. 218; Raymond v. Raymond, (C. C. A. 1897) 83 Fed. Rep. 721. (7) Rev. Stat. U.S., Sec. 1995, 1 Fed. Stat. Annot.788. (8) Bouvier's Law Dictionary. Osborn v. U.S. Bank, (1824) 9 Wheat. U.S. 827; Boyd v. Thayer, (1892) 143 U.S. 162; Postmaster at New Orleans, (1858) 9 OP. Atty. Gen., 259; Minneapolis v. Reum, (1893)12 U.S. App. 446; Am. & Engl. Encyc. of Law(2d ed.) Vol. 6, p. 19. (9) U. S. v. Villato, (1797) 2 Dall. (Pa.) 373; Thurlow v. Massachusetts, (1847) 5 How. U.S. 504; Smith v. Turner,. (1849) 7 How. U.S. 283; Chirse v. Chirse, (1817) 2 Wheat. U.S. 269; Collet w. Collet, (1792) 2 Dall. U.S. 294; U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark. (1898) 169 U.S. 640. That the exercise of the power to pass naturalization laws by the State governments is incompatible with the grant of a power to Congress to pass uniform laws on that subject, is obvious, from the consideration that the former would be dissimilar and frequently contradictory; whereas the system is directed to be uniform, which can only be rendered so by the exclusive power in one body to form them. Golden v. Prince, (1814) 3 Wash. cU. S.) 313. Our foreign intercourse being exclusively committed to the general government, it is peculiarly their province to determine who are entitled to the privileges of American citizens, and the protection of American government. And the citizens of any one State being entitled by the Constitution to enjoy tho rights of citizenship in every other State, that fact creates an interest in this particular in each other's acts, which does not exist with regard to their bankrupt laws; since State acts of naturalization would thus be extra-territorial in their operation, and have an influence on the most vital interests of other States. Ogden v. Saunders, (1827) 12 Wheat (U.S.) 277. (10) See U.S. Rev. Stat., Title XXX, Sec. 2165, 5Fed. Stat. Annot.?00. (11) See U.S. Rev. Stat., Title XXX, Sec. 2172, 5 Fed. Stat. Annot. 209. (12) U.S. Rev. Stat., Title XXX, Sec. 1993, 1 Fed. Stat. Annot. 786. (13) U.S. Rev. Stat., Title XXX, Sec. 2170, 5 Fed. Stat. Annot. 208. (14) U.S. Rev. Stat., Sec. 2166,5 Fed. Stat. Annot. 205. (15) U.S. Rev. Stat., Sec. 2174, 5 Fed. Stat. Annot.210. (16) U.S. Rev. Stat., Sec. 2165, 5 Fed. Stat. Annot. 200. (17) Congress has power to confer and the State courts authority to accept and exercise the power to nationalize aliens. Levin v. U. S.. (C. C. A. 1904) 128 Fed. Rep. 826; Croesue Min, etc., Co. v. Colorado Land, etc., Co.. (1884) 19 Fed. Rep. 78. A State court is the judicial agency of the Federal Government in such proceedings. People v. Sweetman, (Supm. Ct. Gen. T. 1857, 3 Park.Crim. N.Y. 374; In the Matter of Christern. (1978) 43 N. Y. Super. Ct. 523. Congress cannot constrain a State court to exercise this jurisdiction, and the State legislatures may, if they see fit, limit or restrain the exercise of this jurisdiction by the State courts. Rushworth v. Judges. (1895) 58 N.J.L. 97. Ex p. Knowles, (1855) 5 Cal. 300; Matter of Ramsden, (N.Y. Super. Ct. Spec. T.1857) 13 How. Pr. (n.Y.) 429 Concerning the meaning of "having common-law jurisdiction" see Levin v. U.S. (C.C.A. 1904) 128 Fed. REp. 826; U.S. v. Power (1877) 14 Blatchf. U.S. 223; Gladhill, Petitioner, (1844) 8 Met. (Mass.) 168; Citizenship- Levy's Case, (1874) 14 Op. Atty. Gen. 509; Morgan v. Dudley, (1857) 18 B. Mon. (Ky.) 693; U.S. v. Lehman, (1899) 39 Fed.Rep. 49; Ex p. Tweedy, (1884) 22 Fed. Rep. 34 Matter of Conner, (1870) 39 Cal. 98; People v. McGowan. (1875) 77 Ill. 649; People v. Sweetmen, (Supm. Ct. Gen. T. 1857) ? Park. Crim. (N.Y.) 358; Ex p. McKenzie, (1897) 51 S. Car. 244. "If the court may exercise any part of that jurisdiction it is within the language of the statute and within its meaning as well." U.S. v. Power, (1877) 14 Blatchf. U.S. 223. (18) As to a court without a clerk, see Dean, Petitioner, (1891) ?3 Me. 489; Ex p. Cregg, (1854) 2 Curt. U.S. 98; State v. Whittemore, (1870) 50N.H. 245; State v. Webster, (1878) 7 Web. 471; Gladhill, Petitioner, (1844) 8 Met. (Mass.) 171. The court must have a clerk distinct from the judge; not necessarily an officer denominated clerk, but a permanent recording officer, charged with the duty of keeping a true record of the doings of the court and afterwards of authenticating them. Dean, Petitioner, (1891) 83 Me. 489. (19) Omission of name not fatal. ex p. Smith. (1647) 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 395. "An applicant for naturalization is a suitor, who, by his petition, institutes a proceeding in a court of justice for the judicial determination of an asserted right. Every such petition must, of course, allege the existence of all facts, and the fulfillment of all conditions. upon the existence and fulfillment of which the statutes which confer the right asserted have made it dependent." In re Bodek, (1894) 63 Fed. Rep. 813, 3 Pa. Dist. 725. (20) 19 Stat. L., c. 5. p. 2, 5 Fed. Stat. Annot. 205. (21) In re Langtry, (1887) 31 Fed. Rep. 879; Andres v. Arnold (1889) 77 Mich. 87. The last named case discusses the location of the place at which the clerk may take the declaration. See also Butterwortb, Applicant, (1846) 1 Woodb. & M. U.S. 323. Proof of declaration Is made by production of the record or by due certification thereof. In re Fronascone, (1900) 99 Fed. Rep. 48; State v. Barrett, (1889) 40 Minn. 65; Berry v. Hull, (1892) 6 N. Mex. 643. (22) Rev. Stat. U. S. Sec. 2168, 5 Fed. Stat. Annot. 205. (23) Rev. Stat. U. S. Sec. 2167, 5 Fed. Stat. Annot. 206. (24) Contzen v. U.S. (1900) 179 U.S. 195. If he has lived in the United States five years when he attains the age of twenty-one years, he may be admitted to citizenship the next day. Schutz's Petition, (1886) 64 N.H. 241. (25) U.S. Stat. L., Vol. 12, p. 597. This is now Sec.2166 of the Revised Statutes. See 5 Fed. Stat. annot. 205. (26) In re Bailey, (1872) 2 Sawy. U.S. 200; Berry v. Hull, (1892) 6 N. Mex. 643. (27) In re Bailey, (1872) 2 Sawy. U.S. 200; Berry v. Hull, (1892) 6 N. Mex. 643. (28) U.S. Stat. L., Vol. 28, p. 124, 5 Fed. Stat. Annot. 206. (29) The fact t hat he cannot read or write does not make him ineligible, if he is shown to be of good moral character. In re Rodriquez, (1897) 81 Fed. Rep. 355. But a perjurer is ineligible. In re Spenser, (1878) 5Sawy. U.S. 195; and a Socialist was rejected. Ex p. Sauer, (1891) 81 Fed. REp. 355, note. "Upon general principles it would seem that whatever is forbidden by the law of the land ought to be considered, for the time being, immoral, within the purview of this statute." In re Spenser4, (1878) 5 Sawy. U.S. 195. (30) But a foreigner ignorant of the English language and who did not know the name of the President, but thought that Washington was President, was held ineligible. In re Kanska Nian, (1889) 6 Utah 259. (31) See 5 Fed. Stat. Annot., p. 202, and the following cases cited: In re Bodek, (1894) 63 Fed. Rep. 814; Lanz v. Randall, (1876) 4 Dill. U.S. 425; Baird v. Byrne, (1854) 3 Wall. Jr. (C. C.) 1; Johnson v. U.S., (1893) 29 Ct. Cl. 1; State v. Barrett, (1889) 40 Minn. 65; Matter of -, (1845) 7 Hill (N. Y.) 137; In ew Spenser, (1878) 5 Sawy. U.S. 195; Ex p. Sauer, (1891) 81 Fed. Rep. 355, note; Matter of Clark, (1854) 18 Barb. (N.Y.) 446; Citizenship- -Levy's Case, (1874) 14 Op. Atty. Gen. 509; Matter of Christern, (1878) 43 N. Y. Super. Ct. 623; McCarthy v. Marsh. (l85l) 5 N.Y. 263; State v. Macdonald, (1877) 24 Minn. 48; Banks v. Walker, (1848) 3 Barb. Ch. (N.Y.) 438; Sprat v. Spratt, (1830) 4 Pet. U.S. 406; Green v. Salas (1887) 31 Fed. Rep. 106; Stark 9. Chesapeake Ins. Co., (1813) 7 Cranch U.S. 420; The Acorn, (1870) 2 Abb.U.S. 434;People v. McGowan, (1875) 77 Ill. 644; Ritchie v. Putnam, (1835) 13 Wend. (N.Y.) 524; Com. v. Towles, (1835) 5 Leigh (Va.) 743; McDaniel v. Richards, (1821) 1 McCord L. (S. Car.) 187; State v. Hoeflinger, (1874) 35 Wis. 393; Vaux v. Nesbit, (1826) 1 McCord Eq. (S. Car.) 352; In re McCoppin, (1869) 5 Sawy. U.S. 630; Contzen v. U.S. (1900) 179U.S. 191; Boyd v. Thayer, (1892) 143 U.S. 178; Blight v. Rochester, (1822) 7 Wheat. U.S. 546; Strickley v. HIll, (1900) 22 Utah 268; Hogan v. Kurtz, (1876) 94 U.S. 773; Kreitz v. Behrensmeyer, (1888) 125 Ill. 141; People v. McNally, (Supm. Ct. Spec. T. 1880) ?9 How. Pr. (N.Y.) 500; Sasportas v. De la Motta, (1858) 10 RichEq. (S. Car.) 38; Nalle v. Fenwick, (1826) 4 Rand. (Va.) 585; Miller v. Reinhart, (1855) 18 Ga. 239; Belcer v. Farren, (1891) ?9 Cal. 78; Matter of Desty, (N.Y. Super. Ct. Spec. T. 1880) 8 Abb. ". Cas. (N.Y.) 250; Prentice v. MIller, (1890) 82 Cal. 570; Slade v. Minor, (1817) 2 Cranch (C.C.) 139; Gagnon v. U.S. (1902) ?8 Ct. Cl. 10; Dryden v. Swinburne, (1882) 20 W. Va. 89; Navigation Laws, (1883) 17 Op. Atty. Gen. 534; In re An Alien, (1842) 1?ed. Cas. No. 201a; Anonymous, (1846) 4 N.Y. Leg. Obs. 98, 1 "ed. Cas. No. 465; U.S. v. Norsch, (1890) 42 Fed. REp. 417; U.S. v. Grottkau, (1887) 30 Fed. REp. 672. (32) Minor w. Hoppersett, (1874) 21 Wall. U.S. 142; U.S. Stat. L., Sec. 1994, 1 Fed. Stat. Annot. 786; Dorsey v. Brigham, (1898) 177 Ill. 250; Kane v. McCarthy, (1869) 63 N. Car. 299. Since the extension of the naturalization laws to persons of African descent, this statutory provision is applicable to negro as well as white women. Broadis v. Broadis, (1898) 66 Fed. Rep. 951. (33) Rev. Stat. U.S. Sec. 2168, 5 Fed. Stat. Annot. 207. (34) Ruckgaber v. Moore, (1900)104 Fed. Rep. 948. (35) Leonard v. Grant, (1880)5 Fed. REp. 11; U.S. v. Kellar, (1882) 13 Fed. Rep. 82, (1882) 11 Biss. U.S. 314. "No law expressly providing for a temporary or contingent citizenship is known to the legislation of the United States, and so unusual and singular a purpose ought not to be attributed to Congress without an explicit provision to that effect." Leonard v. Grant (1880) 5 Fed. Rep.11. (36) Kelly v. Owen. (1868) 7 Wall. U.S. 496. Notwithstanding the letter of the statute "might herself be lawfully naturalized," it is only necessary that the woman should be a person of the class or race permitted to be naturalized by existing laws. It is not required that she should have the statutory qualifications as to residence, conduct, and opinions. Being the wife of a citizen, she is regarded as qualified for citizenship, and therefore is considered a citizen. Leonard v. Grant, (1880) 5 Fed. Rep. 11. (37) Headman v. Rose, (1879) 63Ga. 458. (38) See (1874) 14Op. Atty.-Gen. 402; but see Ruckgaber v. Moore, (1900) 104 Fed. REp. 948. (39) Burton v. Burton, (1864) 1 Keyes (N.Y.) 359; approved in Kelly v. Owen, (1868) 7Wall. U.S. 496; Kane v. McCarthy, (1869) 63 N. Car. 299. (40) Berthemy's Case, (1866) 12 Op. Atty.-Gen. 7. (41) "Not only may a man be a citizen of the United Sates without being a citizen of a State,but an important element is necessary to convert the former into the latter. He must reside within the State to make him a citizen of it, but it is only necessary that he should be born or naturalized in the United States to be a citizen of the Union." Slaughter-House Cases, (1872) 16 Wall. U.S. 36.